





A number of empirical works have analyzed the effect of agglomeration on
multinational investment verifying whether the agglomerated areas attract foreign direct
investment inflows. Despite the large amount of studies, there has been no systematic
attempts to disentangle whether FDI are drawn by the concentration of firms within the same
sector (specialization) or within different sectors (diversity). Furthermore, the question
whether firms’ size of the host area influences multinational investment is still unanswered.
This paper provides an empirical evidence on the role of agglomeration economies in
attracting foreign direct investments within Italian regions and provinces, distinguishing
between specialization and diversity externalities, and on the role of firms’ size in affecting
foreign investors’ choices. We employ a new territorial data set on foreign direct investment
collected by the Italian Foreign Exchange Office for industrial and service sectors. We find a
strong evidence that specialized geographic areas attract FDI, whereas diversified areas draw
FDI only for industrial sectors; finally there is little evidence that firm size has an impact on
FDI, if anything, only big firms in Southern regions would seem to affect positively foreign
investor decisions.
JEL classification: F21, R12, R30.
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In the last years many empirical studies analyzed the effect of agglomeration
economies on multinational investment verifying whether the agglomerated areas attract
foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows
2. Although the empirical literature encompasses a
large body of studies, up to now certain aspects of the link between agglomeration and the
inflows of FDI have still been neglected. For example, to our knowledge there has not been a
systematic assessment of the role of intra-industry and inter-industry externalities on FDI. In
other words, whether FDI are attracted to some areas thanks to the agglomeration of firms
producing similar goods or, on the contrary, thanks to the concentration of firms producing
different goods and services. In the first case, foreign investors would be attracted to capture
industry specific externalities, such as the intra-industry knowledge spillovers that stem from
the spatial concentration of firms within the same industry (Marshall, 1920; Krugman, 1991;
Fujita et al., 1999). In the second case, the incentive to invest would arise from the variety of
industries within a geographic region being able to activate inter-industry knowledge
spillovers and diversification economies (Jacobs, 1969).
A further aspect unexplored by the empirical analysis is whether the firms’ size in the
host areas affects FDI inflows. As some scholars argue, local markets based on small and
medium enterprises can be more productive because local competition stimulates firms to
rapidly innovate or adopt new technology (Porter, 1990; Pyke et al., 1990). Along these
lines, we expect that markets based on small firms can be conducive to productivity growth
and consequently can draw foreign investors. On the other hand, several considerations can
induce to believe that big firms are important to attract foreign investments. For example,
foreign investors can be interested in acquiring large firms to rapidly expand their market
shares. In addition, others argue that the location of big firms in some areas can stimulate
FDI in the same areas since it favors forward and backward linkages or because, in a context
of imperfect information, it signals the efficiency of the area (Mariotti and Piscitello, 1995;
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Ó Hualláchain et al., 1997; Wei et al. 1999). These  aspects are particularly relevant to the
Italian economy given the scarcity of big firms and, on the opposite, the crucial role played
by the small and medium enterprises in certain parts of the country, as in the industrial
districts or in the South.
This paper aims to contribute some empirical evidence on the role of the
agglomeration economies in attracting foreign direct investment inflows within Italian
regions and provinces. In particular, we distinguish between sector specific and non-sector
specific externalities to verify whether FDI move towards sectoral specialized or sectoral
diversified areas. In addition, the aim is also to contribute to understanding if the firms’ size
of the host area affects foreign investor choices.
To understand which type of economic structure is preferred by the international
investors is more than an academic question. In order to implement the appropriate
intervention, the policy-makers would like to know what are the forces driving inward FDI.
In this respect, the analysis turns out to be particularly important to the Italian economy in
that it is characterized by strong territorial inequalities.
The location theories argue that both domestic and foreign firms are located in the
regions with more favorable factor endowments, thus the correlation between the incumbent
firms and the foreign investment can be due to factor endowment and not to agglomeration
externalities (Head et al., 1995). The empirical models testing for agglomeration may lead to
spurious results if no controls for factor endowment are utilized. Unlike the majority of
existing studies on agglomeration and FDI, we paid special attention to control for the effect
of factor endowment in the econometric model.
This paper adds to the existing literature on FDI and agglomeration in three respects
3.
First, it attempts to assess the role of different kinds of agglomeration externalities, within
the same industry or among different industries, as well as the role of the firms’ size in
affecting foreign investment. Second, this work is based on a new data base on FDI collected
                                                                                                                                                                               
2 Among others: Coughlin et al. (1991), Wheeler and Mody (1992), Woodward (1992), Head et al. (1994,
1995), Braunerhjelm and Svensson (1996), Billington (1999), Wei et al. (1999), Basile (2001).
3 Previous works on Italian territorial data have been carried out by Mariotti and Piscitello (1994) and
Basile (2001).8
by Italian Foreign Exchange Office (Ufficio Italiano Cambi) for the Italian regions and
provinces. For the regions data are also available by sector. The region-sector panel has the
advantage of allowing to control for omitted or unobservable factors both at regional and
sectoral level by introducing fixed effects in the FDI equation. Finally, we focus on
manufacturing as well as on services. The interest of including the service industries is
twofold: first of all, the spatial concentration of certain knowledge intensive service sectors
(e.g. finance industry; see Dekle, 2002) could suggest that the agglomeration economies can
play a central role not only for the location choice of manufacturing firms, but also for firms
supplying services. In addition, foreign investors could be interested in investing within the
areas endowed with substantial service industries, in order to benefit from a large and
differentiated supply of inputs; thus a comprehensive analysis on agglomeration externalities
should include services in the investigation.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we will briefly review the
theoretical and empirical literature on agglomeration and FDI. In the third section, the FDI
geographical distribution will be explored through a descriptive analysis. The fourth section
will be devoted to discussing the empirical model. The results of the estimates and some
extensions of the benchmark model will be presented in section five. The final paragraph
contains the concluding remarks and some suggestions for future research.
￿￿￿5HODWHG￿OLWHUDWXUH
2.1  7KHRUHWLFDO￿EDFNJURXQG
Since the pioneering work of Marshall (1920), economic theory has recognized that a
common location of firms within the same industry can generate positive externalities. These
types of benefits called also MAR externalities from the works of Marshall, Arrow and
Romer (see Glaeser et al., 1992), represent the main rationale for the birth and development
of industrial districts, namely certain areas highly specialized in producing similar goods
(Pyke et al., 1990).
The theory indicates three main sources of this type of agglomeration economies:
knowledge spillovers, labor-pooling, and inputs sharing. The first source is based on the idea9
that physical proximity would facilitate the transmission of knowledge among firms and
workers. The flow of ideas and the knowledge of new technologies would spread out more
rapidly across firms that are concentrated in specialized areas, thanks to the informal
contacts and the mobility of workers across firms, consequently the growth of firms’
productivity within these areas should be more rapid
4. A second source evoked by the
literature is related to the formation of specialized local labor markets. In this view, the firms
of the same industry would be attracted to the areas where skilled workers are available in
large number, in order to avoid labor shortage or bottlenecks. At the same time workers are
attracted by firms’ agglomeration in order to reduce the likelihood of remaining without
work. Other things being equal, this mechanism would reduce the risk premium embodied in
wage, increasing the supply of specialized workers and advantaging the firms that pay a
lower wage. Finally, as further source of externalities the theory mentions the availability of
a wide range of services and productive inputs within a geographically concentrated market.
In such a case the benefits for the firms derive from the high specialization of input suppliers
and from the lower transaction costs due to proximity.
 Apart from the MAR externalities, economic literature has emphasized further types
of positive externalities stemming from agglomeration that, unlike MAR economies, regard
firms belonging to different industries located within a common area. This type of external
economies, called Jacobs externalities from Jacobs (1969), are based on the idea that the
diversity and variety of spatially proximate industries promote the transfer of knowledge and
productivity growth. According to this stream of research it is the overall industrial variety
and scale, rather than the specialization in one industry, that boosts the economic growth
through the cross fertilization of ideas and the transmission of the innovations from one
industry to another. In such a case the emphasis is placed on the process of inter-industry
transmission of knowledge.
According to the theory other features of the economic structure of a geographic area
may affect productivity growth and consequently encourage FDI. On one hand some argue
that local productive markets based on small firms experience rapid growth because local
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competition encourages firms to innovate or rapidly adopt new technologies (Porter, 1990).
Similarly, the literature on industrial district highlighted the efficiency gains of local
productive systems based on small enterprises, mentioning the benefits of higher division of
labor and the competition-collaboration relationships amongst small firms. In such a type of
structure the flow of ideas will be rapid and likewise the productivity growth (Pyke et al.,
1990; Signorini, 2000). From this point of view, the regions where small firms prevail
should attract more foreign investors. On the other hand, numerous factors can motivate
foreign enterprises to invest within areas populated by big firms. For example, if foreign
firms made cross border investment to expand their market shares or to acquire specific
assets, as production technology or marketing know-how, they would be interested in the
acquisition of big firms, which both may ensure larger market shares and possess larger
stock of knowledge as compared with small enterprises. Moreover, some argue that big firms
are particularly capable to activate forward and backward linkages, thus foreign suppliers of
facilities can have interest in locating nearby large domestic enterprises to minimize
transaction costs (Ó Hualláchain and Reid, 1997). Finally, others pointed out that foreign
firms lack of information on domestic market, thus the presence of big firms may signal the
efficiency of a particular area and consequently may attract investments from abroad
(Mariotti and Piscitello, 1995; Wei et al. 1999). Whether small or big firms draw FDI
inflows is a question that requires an empirical answer.
Some empirical evidence on the effect of specialization, diversity, and small firm
externalities on firm productivity is provided, among others, by Glaeser et al. (1992),
Henderson et al. (1995), Deckle (2002) and Cingano e Schivardi (2003).
2.2  7KH￿HPSLULFDO￿OLWHUDWXUH￿RQ￿DJJORPHUDWLRQ￿DQG￿)’,
The theory on location choice suggests that foreign investment will be directed
towards the countries or regions ensuring larger profits. Thus, in the empirical literature the
FDI inflows are assumed as function of a set of host country or regional characteristics able
                                                                                                                                                                               
and Feldman, 2003).11
to affect either the revenues generated or costs incurred by firms
5. Since agglomeration can
generate positive externalities on firms, the empirical literature has verified whether
agglomeration attracts FDI
6. On the whole, the results display a positive effect of
agglomeration economies within the geographic areas examined which, in the cited studies,
vary from large areas like national countries or USA States to the smaller sub-national
regions. Although a number of empirical works focused on agglomeration and FDI, the role
played by diversity economies and firm size on FDI inflows has been largely neglected, thus
the question whether foreign investors are attracted within diversified areas or where small
or big firms prevail remains unanswered.
As regards the empirical analysis on agglomeration and FDI two considerations  are in
order. First, in choosing the appropriate proxy for agglomeration the literature does not
follow a unified approach. Instead, the models use different measures of agglomeration only
sometimes sector specifics. Among the works that use non-industry specific variables, we
recall Coughlin et al. (1991) and Wei et al. (1999) that use proxies for density, respectively
approximated by the manufacturing employment, or population, to land area ratio. Others
consider the weight of manufacturing sector: Woodward (1999) and Basile (2001) use the
total number of manufacturing establishments within the area, while Wheeler and Mody
(1992) and Billington (1999) the degree of industrialization, in turn measured by the weight
of manufacturing sector as percent of GDP. Other similar proxies for agglomeration include
infrastructures endowments and FDI previously accumulated (e.g. Wheeler and Mody,
1992). On the other hand, certain studies consider explicit industry specific proxies for
agglomeration more strictly related to the so-called MAR externalities. More specifically,
Braunerhjelm and Svensson (1996) employ a sectoral specialization index, given by the ratio
of sectoral employees to total manufacturing employees, while Head et al. (1994, 1995) the
number of foreign plants already located in the area belonging to the same sector and
country of origin.
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the country or region i and Xi is a vector of appropriate explanatory variables referring to the host area i.
Coughlin (1998) presents a comprehensive survey of the empirical literature on FDI in USA.
6 Coughlin et al. (1991), Wheeler and Mody (1992), Woodward (1992), Head et al. (1994, 1995),
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A second consideration regards how the empirical works disentangle the effect  of
agglomeration from the effect of the geographic distribution of productive factor
endowment. As Head et al. (1995) insightfully pointed out, both domestic firms and foreign
investors may be attracted to the regions with more favorable factors’ endowment. Therefore,
the significance of agglomeration may capture the correlation between the location of
domestic firms and FDI due to the endowment effect, instead of verifying the agglomeration
externalities. For instance, if there is considerable availability of industry specific inputs in a
particular area, we can expect that firms of the same industry, both national and foreign, will
be located in that region; e.g. the availability of ports will attract domestic and foreign firms
of the shipping industry. For this reason the endowment effect could be conducive to
spurious results on agglomeration effect.
In order to overcome such a problem Head et al. (1995), studying Japanese investment
in United States, use the number of USA establishments in the corresponding sectors as
control for industry specific location factors and the number of incumbent Japanese plants of
the same sector as proxy for agglomeration. They argue that the geographic distribution of
the national establishments in a particular industry should incorporate all the relevant
information on the distribution of inputs intensively used in that industry; thus they consider
the distribution of domestic plants an appropriate control variable for factor endowment.
Furthermore, they suggest introducing industry and geographic fixed effects to control for
unobserved characteristics related to industries and geographic areas. In our paper we
carefully deal with this issue by an opportune standardization of the dependent variable.
￿￿￿7KH￿GDWD
Before starting with the econometric analysis, we present the FDI data employed in
this paper as well as some stylized facts about the geographic pattern of FDI in Italy. The
data measure the gross foreign direct investment inflows, by each region and province, used
to compile the balance of payment
7. The data span the period between 1994 and the first
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semester 2000 and are compiled by the Italian Foreign Exchange Office (Ufficio Italiano
Cambi)
8. An initial characteristic emerging from our data is the elevated territorial
concentration of FDI. The first three regions (Piemonte, Lombardia, Lazio) account for
about 60% of the national stock accumulated during the period (Tab. 1). This result can be
affected by the presence of the major urban systems within these regions; as Table 2 shows
the concentration at the provincial level is greater than the concentration at the regional
level, with  the first three provinces that absorb, as a whole, over half of the total FDI.
Of course, these results might depend on the economic size of the regions, or
provinces, thus a more appropriate measure of FDI concentration must be one that rules out
the size effect of the geographic area. For this reason, we compared the regional and
provincial FDI concentration with the corresponding value added concentration. The
exercise is carried out by Lorenz curves and Gini indexes computed for regional and
provincial FDI, and reported in Figure 1. The FDI seem cluster in space even if we control
for the region or province size; in 1998 the Gini index was equal to 0.57 for all-sector
regional FDI, rising to 0.68 for all-sectors provincial FDI. The higher spatial concentration at
provincial level can be due to the strong attractive power of metropolitan areas. The
hypothesis is supported by the FDI concentration in services that appears higher than in
manufacturing: the Gini indexes were 0.59 and 0.45 respectively. Finally, the territorial
disparities seems to be rising over time: from 1994 to 1998 all the Gini indexes show a small
increase.
As a further step of the descriptive analysis, we investigate the influence of the space
on the attraction of FDI by running spatial autocorrelation test. The purpose of the
verification is to capture if a certain variable, in this case FDI, follows a similar pattern over
space. For example, a positive autocorrelation of FDI across provinces would indicate that
provinces which are geographically close have low or high FDI all together, on the other
hand a negative autocorrelation would suggest a competitiveness among near provinces, for
which the investments assume dissimilar values. In order to test for spatial autocorrelation, it
is necessary first to measure the geographical distance among provinces by the spatial
weight matrix, of which the generic element wij represents a measure of the distance between
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province i and j. For example, the matrix may assume the form of the contiguity matrix when
wij =1 if the provinces border and wij =0 otherwise, or the form of a distance matrix when wij
equals the inverse of the kilometric distances between each pairs of provinces. In the
following, in order to test for the spatial autocorrelation we run the Moran , test using the
two matrices described above
9. The verification will be carried out on the ratio of FDI to the
provincial value added, both calculated as time averages.
The results of the Moran , test, reported in Table 3, reveal a global spatial dependence
of the provincial FDI: the spatial autocorrelation is positive and statistically significant with
both contiguity and distance matrices; similar conclusions are derived by breaking down the
foreign investments by countries of origins. However, the phenomenon involves the southern
provinces, but not those of the Center-North for which the statistic appears insignificant. In
other words, the empirical evidence would indicate stronger territorial polarization inside the
Southern area rather than within the Center-North.
The location choices seem rather similar among countries: the provincial correlation of
FDI by country of origin results positive and relatively high, especially for USA, EMU and
extra-EMU (Tab. 4).
In summary, from this section foreign investment come out highly concentrated over
space, especially when the data include the service sector. The effect could depend on the
attractiveness of the metropolitan areas for investors in services. Moreover, the geographical
factor, namely the distance among provinces, seems to play a role in explaining the
investment distribution over the national territory: close provinces follow similar patterns. In
the next section we will investigate these aspects in more detail.
                                                        
9 Moran (1948). For a discussion of the test see among others: Anselin (1988) and the special number of the
International Regional Science Review, vol. 20, n. 1-2 (1997). The test of Moran I is carried out under the
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￿￿￿7KH￿HPSLULFDO￿VWUDWHJ\
4.1  7KH￿UHJLRQDO￿PRGHO
Economic theory suggests that a foreign firm decides to invest in the region that
guarantees the highest expected profits net of any fixed costs, including sunk costs. From the
empirical viewpoint, the expected profits are not directly observable, by contrast we can
observe only the realized FDI in each region. In such circumstances data are censored and
the appropriate statistical model to estimate a FDI equation is the Tobit estimated by the
maximum likelihood method (Tobin, 1958):
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where y* is a latent variable not directly observable; α  denotes the regional and sectoral
fixed effects; Xi,j represents a vector of explanatory variables able to expand the expected
profits; β  indicates a vector of corresponding parameters to be estimated;  i,j~N(0,σ ε ) is a
stochastic normal error; i=1,…,20 and j=1,…,15 denote region and sector respectively;
finally FDIi,j are foreign direct investment inflows.
The coefficients of the Tobit model simultaneously measure two different effects: the
impact of the corresponding regressor on the probability that the region receives FDI and the
impact of the corresponding regressor on the level of the FDI in the regions where they are
positive (McDonald and Moffitt, 1980). The panel structure of the data is particularly useful
because it enables us to control for unobservable or omitted factors through fixed effects at
the sectoral and regional level. The fixed effects are represented by additive dummies
10.
                                                        
10 This choice requires a brief discussion. The ML estimates of the coefficients of a Tobit model with fixed
effects is not consistent for T fixed and N→∞  (see among others: Hsiao 1986, Baltagi 1995, Arellano and
Honoré 2001). As in other non-linear models (logit, probit), in the Tobit the number of the parameters increases
along with the number of observations, going to infinity, and it is not  possible to change the model in order to16
The dependent variable of the econometric model is the FDI-intensity defined as the
cumulated FDI divided by the value added, by each region and sector. The cumulated FDI
are computed over the gross investment flows from 1994 to 2000; the value added refers to
1994, which is the starting year of foreign investment data. We preferred to cumulate the
flows since foreign investment present an elevated time variability. For region i and sector j
the FDI intensity is measured as:
￿)’,9$’￿=(Cumulated FDI 1994-2000)i,j/(Value added 1994)i,j
The motivation for using such ratio as dependent variable is that it controls for the
effect of productive factors’ endowment. Head et al. (1995) argued that regions with
favorable factor endowment will attract domestic as well as foreign investors. As a result the
correlation between domestic firms and foreign investment, due to this endowment effect,
can be confused with the effect of agglomeration economies and a model testing for
agglomeration without controls for endowment may lead to spurious results on
agglomeration effect. Head et al. suggest introducing proxies for the geographical
distribution of inputs as control for endowment effect.
In our model, the value added by region and sector is the control variable for factor
endowment. In fact, the number of firms located in a given area should depend on factors’
endowment, consequently the value added will be larger in the regions with more favorable
endowment. In order to limit potential multicollinearity among regressors the value added is
used as scale factor, i.e. the control for endowment is carried out by dividing the FDI by the
value added and taking this ratio as the dependent variable. Of course, this introduces a
restriction in the model: to divide FDI by the value added is equivalent to restrict the
coefficient of the value added to one in a log-linear regression model of FDI on value added.
                                                                                                                                                                               
rule out the fixed effect, as in linear models. For the Tobit model with fixed effects, Honoré (1992) proposes a
semi parametric estimator consistent and asymptotically normal. But, at the same time through a Monte Carlo
experiment he demonstrates that the asymptotic distribution is a good proxy for the effective one only if
N≥ 200. Besides, the results of Heckman (1981) suggest not overestimating the bias of the ML estimates of the
Tobit model with additive dummies that control for the fixed effects. Indeed he shows, through Monte Carlo
method, that the bias of the ML estimates of a static probit model with fixed effect is negligible if N is not too
bigger than T (in the experiment N=100 and T=8). According to these results, Arellano (2000) suggests
estimating by ML the non linear model with fixed effects if the ratio N/T is finite and not too big. Since in our
paper the dimension of the panel belongs to these classes (i=20 and j=15), following Braunerhjelm et al. (1996)
we decided to use the additive dummies for the fixed effect and estimate the model by ML method.17
If the “true” coefficient were greater that one, the standardization could be conducive to
model misspecification. In several regressions run to test this hypothesis the coefficient
turned out to be non-statistically significant from one, hence the model does not seem to be
affected by misspecification
11.
In the model the FDI-intensity also permits taking account of the correlation between
foreign investment and location of domestic firms due to investment by acquisitions. In the
data we cannot distinguish between greenfield investment and acquisitions: we expect the
acquisition of domestic firms will follow the geographic pattern of incumbent firms, thus
through dividing FDI by the value added we also control for acquisitions as well as for
endowment effect
12.
Following the theoretical insights discussed in section 2, the regional model estimated
is the following:
(1)
()’,9$’)i,j = α 1(6SHFLDOL]DWLRQ)i,j + α 2(’HQVLW\)i,j + α 3(’HQVLW\B2WKHUV)i,j +  α 4(’LYHUVLW\)i,j
+ α 5(6PDOO) i,j + α 6(%LJ) i,j + α i(5HJLRQDO￿IL[HG￿HIIHFWV) + α j(6HFWRUDO￿IL[HG￿HIIHFWV)
The equation includes different proxies for agglomeration externalities in the vector of
explanatory variables Xi,j, namely MAR (specialization) and Jacob (diversity) externalities,
as well as two variables measuring the average firms’ size.
The first hypothesis tested is whether MAR externalities attract foreign investors. A
common measure of MAR economies is a sector specialization index computed on the
industry employment (see Glaeser et al. 1992):
6SHFLDOL]DWLRQi,j￿= (IS-1)i,j/(IS+1)i,j;
                                                        
11 See below the section dedicated to robustness checks.
12 Mariotti and Piscitello (1994) use a similar dependent variable for the same reason. The FDI intensity
allows also to take account of all omitted factors that attract both foreign and domestic investors, e.g. labor
costs.18
where IS=(Ni,j/∑ jNi,j)/(NNational,j/∑ jNNational, j); and Ni,j is the employment in region i and
industry j. In our case the index is standardized and constrained within the interval (–1, 1)
(see Paci and Usai, 2000).
To investigate in more detail the role played by the agglomeration of firms  belonging
to the same sector, we employ an alternative measure of MAR externalities strictly related to
the geographic scope of agglomeration economies. More specifically, following Ciccone and
Hall (1996) who claimed that density is important to foster technological spillovers on the
ground that spatial density enhances the transmission of ideas, we include a proxy for
sectoral density:
’HQVLW\i,j = (Ni,j/Landi)/(NNational,j/LandNational);
where Land denotes the surface of the region. The index will be greater than one if in region
i the activity j is denser than the national average. We expect that both variables related to
MAR economies will have a positive impact on FDI inflows.
Different types of agglomeration economies can arise from the diversity of the regional
economic structure. As Jacobs (1969) pointed out, inter-sectoral knowledge spillovers may
strengthen firm productivity, therefore industrially diversified regions could attract foreign
investors. However, knowledge spillovers are not the unique source of agglomeration
economies related to the sectoral diversity. For example, FDI can be attracted by sectorally
diversified areas because the geographic concentration of firms producing different goods
and services can reduce the transaction costs and thus expand profits of foreign investors
located within the same area. Our econometric model is unable to distinguish between the
two sources of externalities, rather we consider both falling into a broad category of non-
sector specific agglomeration economies. Following Henderson et al. (1995) as measure of
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￿
L￿M￿=(Ni,j*)/∑ j*≠ j(N i,j*) and M￿=1,…15.19
For the region i and sector j, the index is measured over all the industrial and service
sectors except j and it is decreasing with the relative diversity of the area respect to the
national average. Higher indexes indicate lesser diversified areas, thus the economic theory
predicts a negative sign of the corresponding coefficient.
In order to deepen the analysis of FDI and non-sector specific agglomeration, besides
’LYHUVLW\￿ we include another explanatory variable in the model which represents an
alternative measure of Jacobs economies; such a variable is the global density of the region
computed over all the industries other than j (relative to the national average):
’HQVLW\B2WKHUVi,j = ∑ j* (Nij*/Landi)/∑ j* (NNational,j*/LandNational); with j*≠  j.
We expect ’HQVLW\B2WKHUV￿to be positively correlated with FDI.
An additional issue examined by this paper is if the firms’ size of the host area can
affect inward FDI. We employ two different explanatory variables to test for firm size effect
on FDI inflows:
6PDOO￿= (Share of workers employed in small firms relative to the national
share)i,j;
%LJ￿= (Share of workers employed in big firms relative to the national
share)i,j;




The provincial model differs from the regional one in three respect. First of all since at
provincial level FDI data are not available by sector, the econometric model is estimated on
a cross section of provinces for the whole economy taking together manufacturing and
                                                        
13 In the robustness check we employ also different threshold values.
 See appendix for the sources of  the
data.20
services. Second, the provincial endowment of infrastructures is used as additional
explanatory variable. A number of empirical works demonstrated that infrastructures are able
to attract foreign investment, being able to reduce production and transportation costs
(Coughlin, 1991; Wheleer et al., 1992; Wei et al., 1999; Basile, 2001). In the regional model
the fixed effects capture the role played by infrastructures as well as any other regional
omitted variable. If we did not incorporate infrastructures, the provincial model could suffer
from misspecification because of omitted variable; thus we added a measure of
infrastructures among the regressors. Finally, as emerged from the descriptive section, FDI
came out spatially correlated across provinces. Therefore the provincial model incorporates
the dependent variable spatially lagged for capturing spatial dependence and avoiding
misspecification due to spatial autocorrelation. Since spatially lagged dependent variables
are endogenous (Anselin, 1988), the model is estimated by instrumental variable using as
instrument the spatially lagged infrastructures
14.
The model estimated for provinces is the following:
(2)
()’,9$’)i = α 1()’,9$’B6SDWLDOO\￿/DJJHG)i + α 2(’HQVLW\)i + α 3(’LYHUVLW\)i + α 4(6PDOO)i +
α 5(%LJ)i + α 6(,QIUDVWUXFWXUHV)i + α h(5HJLRQDO￿IL[HG￿HIIHFWV)
where i=1,…95 are Italian provinces,￿)’,9$’, ’HQVLW\, 6PDOO and %LJ are calculated as in
the regional model but are computed for industry and services all together; ,QIUDVWUXFWXUHV￿is
an index that measures the total infrastructures; the dependent variable spatially lagged is
equal to:
￿￿)’,9$’￿6SDWLDOO\￿/DJJHG￿L ￿∑ N￿￿ZLN￿)’,9$’N￿￿
where the spatial weight wik=(Bordik/∑ k≠ iBordik) comes from the contiguity matrix (Bordik=1
if provinces i and k border and 0 otherwise). Finally, for provinces ’LYHUVLW\ is computed
over the all sectors:
                                                        
14 Anselin (1988) suggests using as instruments for spatially lagged dependent variable some explanatory
variables of the model spatially lagged. Infrastructures spatially lagged seemed to us the appropriate instrument
given that they are strongly correlated with FDI spatially lagged, with coefficient equal to 0.78.21
’LYHUVLW\= (Herfindahli/HerfindahlNational);
where Herfindahli=∑ j s2i,j; s2i,j=(Ni,j)/∑ j(N i,j) and j=1,…15 are the same industrial and
services sectors of the regional model15.
￿￿￿5HVXOWV
￿￿￿￿ 5HJLRQDO￿UHVXOWV
The models have been estimated in log-linear form. Since some variables were not
strictly positive, to allow the logarithmic transformation we added a unit constant to these
variables: namely, to the dependent variable of the regional model that sometimes was equal
to zero and to some explanatory variables
16. Table 5 gives some descriptive statistics of the
regional sample.
The results of the regional model for all sectors are presented in Table 6; all the
estimates include regional and sectoral fixed effects that always are statistically significant
17.
In the first six columns we present the results for the explanatory variables introduced in the
model one at a time, columns (7)-(9) provide the estimates of the complete models. MAR
externalities are proxied by either 6SHFLDOL]DWLRQ￿or ’HQVLW\, Jacobs externalities by ’LYHUVLW\
or ’HQVLW\B2WKHUV; since the two proxies for  density (’HQVLW\ and ’HQVLW\B2WKHUV) are
correlated they are not used together. The econometric evidence suggests that MAR
externalities strongly affect FDI inflows. The more a region is sectorally specialized or
dense, the more the region will draw FDI of the same sector. On the contrary, there is no
statistical evidence of the influence of Jacobs externalities: neither density of the other
sectors nor sectoral diversity are significant. Similar findings are drawn from firm size, that
comes out non-significant to explain the geographic pattern of FDI.
                                                        
15 More information on the data can be found in appendix.
16 The variables are 6SHFLDOL]DWLRQ that assumes negative values, %LJ that sometimes is zero, and 6PDOO￿that,
even though it always is strictly positive, it has been transformed for uniformity with %LJ.
17 For example, the results of likelihood ratio tests for regional and sectoral effects within model (7) of table
6 are respectively 183.8 and 90.7; both are jointly significant at more than 99 per cent.22
The industrial sectors could behave differently from services. For example the role
played by agglomeration forces, such as the effect of large metropolitan  areas, could be
stronger in services than industrial sectors. To some extent, the evidences emerged from the
descriptive section, by showing a larger geographic concentration in services, would support
this view. Therefore, we have estimated the model only for the industrial sectors obtaining
rather different results (Tab. 7). MAR externalities continue to have a significant impact on
foreign investment location; both 6SHFLDOL]DWLRQ and ’HQVLW\ have statistically significant
coefficients and the expected signs. Moreover, unlike the whole economy within the
industrial sectors Jacobs externalities seem to play a role. The coefficient of ’HQVLW\B2WKHUV
and ’LYHUVLW\ are statistically significant with the expected sign, although they are significant
only when the models take MAR externalities into account. The result is confirmed by
several robustness tests
18. Since the restricted model neglects a significant variable, the
results of larger models (models 7-9) in which all the significant explanatory variables are
included seem more reliable. The outcomes achieved for industrial sector are
straightforwardly interpretable: foreign investors are attracted to the regions with a
diversified structure because of the benefits of being located near a large supply of inputs
and services. However, diversity is important only conditionally on specialization. This
result might suggest that investors first take sectoral specialization into account and then,
among the sectorally specialized regions, invest within the more diversified: in such a case
the relationship between FDI and diversity would emerge together with specialization.
Finally, the findings for firm size are in line with those previously obtained: neither small
nor big enterprises have influence on FDI location choices.
￿￿￿￿ 3URYLQFLDO￿UHVXOWV
The provincial model has been estimated with regional dummies to control for
geographic unobservable factors. Because of the high correlation between the proxies for
                                                        
18 It is worth noting that this result does not rely on collinearity between the variables: the simple correlation
between diversity and specialization is not particularly high (–0.22; between diversity and density –0.55).
Moreover, the results are not even due to the partial correlation between diversity and specialization,
conditionally on regional and sectoral effects: in fact by estimating the model without regional, sectoral or both
the effects we have obtained qualitatively similar results. In addition, it does not depend on some particular23
firm size, Small and Big are inserted one at a time. We present first the results without the
dependent variable spatially lagged and then the IV estimates including it.
From Table 8 Density results strongly correlated with FDI geographic patterns
showing that larger amounts of FDI are located in denser areas. Infrastructures are
significant but only without the other regressor. A result that could depend on the correlation
between infrastructures and density, which in turn shows that a denser area is also more
endowed with infrastructures. Diversity and firm size would not seem to have an influence
on location of foreign firms: in almost all the specifications the related coefficients come out
statistically insignificant.
From the spatial autocorrelation tests carried out within the unconditional statistical
model of section three, FDI were spatially correlated. From the conditional econometric
model the spatial correlation disappears: in Table 9 the spatially lagged dependent variable
does not result significant in any model specifications. This results can be due to fact that
regional dummies incorporate all the relevant information captured by spatially lagged
dependent variable. The other results of IV estimates are rather similar to those previously
obtained: in particular Density is the variable that emerges strongly significant from the
estimates.
￿￿￿￿ ([WHQVLRQV￿DQG￿UREXVWQHVV
The benchmark regional model has been extended in two directions. In particular, in
order to capture any potentially heterogeneous relationship between some explanatory
variables and FDI, we allowed the coefficients of firm size, diversity and specialization to
change across four geographic areas - North-West, North-East, Center and South - by
interacting the explanatory variables with geographic dummies.
On the whole, the empirical evidence provided in Tables 10-12 tends to reject the
hypothesis of heterogeneity and largely confirms previous results. Only two exceptions are
remarkable. First, the role of the big firms in the South: in this case big firms would seem to
have a positive role in attracting FDI within Southern regions. The result could be
                                                                                                                                                                               
region or sector. Similar results are obtained excluding Lombardy that over the period has absorbed almost half24
interpreted in terms of the positive signal emanating from the location of big firms within
these regions, which are in turn capable of improving the reputation of an area affected by
several negative externalities. The second exception is represented by the MAR externalities
that have a positive and significant impact on FDI in North-West and South, but not in the
other zones. Since the two former areas are those with the highest and lowest FDI by value
added, respectively, it would seem that Mar externalities are effective in the extreme cases,
that is when FDI are very scarce or when they are particularly abundant.
The robustness of the results obtained from the baseline regional model has been tested
in several ways. First of all, as we pointed out above, the model could be misspecified if the
relation between FDI and value added, due to factor endowment, was non linear. Thus, we
inserted the log of the value added in the baseline model and we obtained similar results for
both the all-sector model (Tab. 13) and for industrial-sector one (Tab. 14). Next, as further
robustness checks, we have changed the threshold values of firm size variables: from 200 to
50 workers for small firms and from 1,000 to 500 for big firms. In addition, since some
regions, namely Lombardia, Piemonte and Lazio, and certain sectors, as finance services and
metal products, attract the majority of the total FDI accumulated from 1994 to 2000, we have
estimated the models without these regions or sectors. The results for all the sectors, reported
in Table 13, and for the industrial sectors in Tab.14 remain qualitatively unchanged.
Finally, we carried out a further check for industrial sectors only. According to
international methodology our data on FDI involve the initial transaction between domestic
and foreign firms like the initial assets’ acquisition, together with all subsequent capital
transactions between them like the rise of participation share or the invested profits. The
succeeding investment of incumbent foreign firms, located in a given region, could alter our
results on agglomeration. If foreign firms accounted for a large share of the total regional
production, we could have a correlation between FDI and the proxies for agglomeration (e.g.
specialization index) that depends on the successive investment of incumbent foreign firms,
even without agglomeration externalities. In order to control for this effect in the baseline
model of table 7 we inserted, as control variable, the number of workers in foreign firms
                                                                                                                                                                               
of the total FDI, or the energetic products that could have a different behavior from manufacturing sectors.25
located within each region in the initial period by sector
19. The employees of the foreign
firms turned out to be positively correlated with the dependent variable, but its inclusion in
the model did not modify the results previously obtained for the other variables (Tab. 14).
￿￿￿&RQFOXGLQJ￿UHPDUNV
In this paper we have investigated the FDI inflows within the Italian regions and
provinces over the period 1994-2000. From the descriptive analysis, inward foreign
investments appear very territorially concentrated, particularly when we focus on provinces
and services; geographically most FDI are located in the Center-North while in the Southern
regions they are extremely low. Additional statistical analysis has demonstrated that FDI are
spatially autocorrelated across provinces: provinces geographically close follow similar
patterns of FDI, exhibiting either low or high FDI together.
The econometric model was aimed at capturing the role of the agglomeration
economies and of the firms’ size in attracting FDI inflows. In particular we tested for
different types of agglomeration externalities, such as the MAR-externalities related to the
sectoral specialization of a geographic area and the Jacobs-externalities linked to the sectoral
diversity.
We find strong evidence that MAR-externalities influence foreign investors  location
choice: the more a region is specialized and dense, the more it attracts foreign investment
within the same sector
20. Jacobs externalities are significant only within the industrial
sectors, showing that manufacturing FDI would be drawn by the area with a more diversified
supply of inputs and services. Finally there is little evidence that firm size has an impact on
inward FDI, if anything, only big firms in Southern regions would seem to have a positive
effect on foreign investors decisions.
                                                        
19 Data refer to 1994, the initial year of our FDI data base. The analysis is carried out only for industrial
sectors given that data on employees in the foreign firms, provided by the Politecnico of Milan (Reprint data
base), are not available for services.
20 This result is consistent with the evidence provided by Forni and Paba (2002) of stronger intra-industry
than inter-industry technological spillovers26
The empirical findings give support to the hypothesis that the agglomeration
economies attract FDI inflows. Nevertheless, more work needs to be done to better
understand how agglomeration economies operate. For example, as regards MAR-
externalities it is not clear whether the attractive power derives from the existence of
technological spillovers among firms or from a local market of specialized workers or from
both. Further investigations aiming at exploring these issues would represent a valuable
contribution to the debate on the agglomeration externality and FDI
21.
                                                        
21 The paper of Barry et al. (2001) represents a first contribution towards this direction.$SSHQGL[
’DWD￿GHVFULSWLRQ
The data on FDI are provided by the Italian Foreign Exchange Office (Ufficio Italiano
Cambi). Data are the amount of gross FDI inflows, by region and province, collected to
compile the balance of payments. In our data, FDI include greenfield investments and
acquisitions all together. Greenfield investment refers to the construction of new production
facilities, while acquisition is the purchase of existing assets. For acquisitions to be
registered as direct investments they must comprise at least 10% of the domestic firm assets.
At regional level FDI are broken down by 15 one-digit sectors: energetic products, ferrous
production, non-ferrous production, chemical products, metallic products, transport
equipment, food and beverage, textile and clothing, paper and printing, wood and other
manufacturing products, construction, trade services, transports, finance, other private
services. At provincial level data are not available by sector but only for the whole economy,
including industry and services all together. The data on employment by establishment come
from Istat, &HQVXV￿￿￿￿￿. The data on value added and on surface of the regions (provinces)
come from Istat, 5HJLRQDO￿(FRQRPLF￿$FFRXQWV and $QQXDO￿5HSRUW￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ respectively. The
index of the total infrastructures takes into account the availability of different kinds of
productive infrastructures like roads, railways, telecommunication, ports, and airports. The









FDI as a GDP
percentage (3)








Lombardia 44,6 1,5 216,5 19,0
Piemonte 8,3 0,7 94,8 15,7
Lazio 7,7 0,5 77,4 33,9
Veneto 5,1 0,4 55,6 38,5
Emilia-Romagna 4,0 0,3 45,7 5,0
Liguria 1,3 0,3 43,3 16,6
Toscana 1,2 0,1 17,9 -10,4
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 0,7 0,2 29,0 21,7
Trentino-Alto Adige 0,5 0,2 23,7 -0,8
Valle d’Aosta 0,5 1,2 175,8 66,1
Campania 0,4 0,0 6,2 22,8
Marche 0,2 0,1 9,5 -7,7
Abruzzo 0,2 0,1 11,5 -32,1
Sicilia 0,1 0,0 2,0 27,3
Sardegna 0,1 0,0 3,4 23,7
Umbria 0,1 0,0 5,1 13,7
Puglia 0,1 0,0 1,1 18,3
Molise 0,0 0,1 8,2 -39,7
Calabria 0,0 0,0 0,8 97,5
Basilicata 0,0 0,0 1,6 7,9
Not classified 24,8 .. .. ..
Italy (1) 100 0,7 100 20,0
Source of data: UIC. – (1) The national total includes FDI not imputed to any region. – (2) The shares are calculated
over the cumulated gross FDI inflows (1994-2000). – (3) Computed as time averages of cumulated FDI gross inflows
(1994-2000).Tab. 2
)’,￿%<￿3529,1&(
(Cumulative FDI of the first 50 provinces over the years 1994-2000;
percentage values)
OBS Provinces Regions Shares







1 Milano Lombardia 40,1 3,1 392,3
2 Roma Lazio 7,5 0,7 93,2
3 Torino Piemonte 7,3 1,2 155,4
4 Treviso Veneto 2,6 1,3 157,4
5 Bergamo Lombardia 1,3 0,6 73,2
6 Bologna Emilia-Romagna 1,3 0,4 52,4
7 Genova Liguria 1,2 0,5 62,2
8 Brescia Lombardia 1,2 0,4 55,5
9 Ravenna Emilia-Romagna 0,9 1,0 129,2
10 Como Lombardia 0,9 0,7 88,2
11 Modena Emilia-Romagna 0,8 0,4 55,6
12 Vicenza Veneto 0,7 0,3 43,3
13 Varese Lombardia 0,7 0,4 45,5
14 Venezia Veneto 0,6 0,3 38,9
15 Firenze Toscana 0,5 0,2 25,6
16 Aosta Valle d’Aosta 0,5 1,5 190,9
17 Padova Veneto 0,5 0,2 26,5
18 Verona Veneto 0,5 0,2 27,0
19 Reggio Emilia Emilia-Romagna 0,5 0,4 48,6
20 Trieste Friuli-Venezia Giulia 0,3 0,4 50,7
21 Vercelli Piemonte 0,3 0,7 86,0
22 Cuneo Piemonte 0,3 0,2 28,4
23 Bolzano Trentino -Alto Adige 0,3 0,2 26,2
24 Udine Friuli-Venezia Giulia 0,2 0,2 22,8
25 Trento Trentino -Alto Adige 0,2 0,2 25,2
26 Parma Emilia-Romagna 0,2 0,2 26,0
27 Lucca Toscana 0,2 0,3 31,6
28 Alessandria Piemonte 0,2 0,2 25,2
29 Napoli Campania 0,2 0,0 5,6
30 Latina Lazio 0,2 0,2 23,3
(continues)Tab. 2 (continues)
)’,￿%<￿3529,1&(
(Cumulative FDI of the first 50 provinces over the years 1994-2000;
percentage values)
OBS Provinces Regions Shares







31 Ancona Marche 0,2 0,1 17,7
32 Belluno Veneto 0,2 0,3 40,7
33 Lecco Lombardia 0,1 0,2 23,7
34 Forlì Emilia-Romagna 0,1 0,1 18,7
35 Teramo Abruzzo 0,1 0,2 29,0
36 Pavia Lombardia 0,1 0,1 15,7
37 Caserta Campania 0,1 0,1 13,9
38 Pordenone Friuli-Venezia Giulia 0,1 0,2 21,1
39 Livorno Toscana 0,1 0,2 20,3
40 Novara Piemonte 0,1 0,1 15,8
41 Pisa Toscana 0,1 0,1 13,1
42 Piacenza Emilia-Romagna 0,1 0,1 15,9
43 Siena Toscana 0,1 0,1 17,0
44 Perugia Umbria 0,1 0,1 6,3
45 Biella Piemonte 0,1 0,1 15,9
46 Palermo Sicilia 0,1 0,0 4,3
47 Prato Toscana 0,1 0,1 12,5
48 Sondrio Lombardia 0,1 0,2 21,2
49 Rimini Emilia-Romagna 0,1 0,1 11,3
50 Frosinone Lazio 0,1 0,1 7,3
Not classified 24,8











Test – Moran Z
(wij= distance)
Center-North provinces 67 0,04 0,78 -0,01 0,51
South provinces 36 0,27 2,59*** 0,14 3,70***
7RWDO ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
Country
USA 103 0,06 1,12 0,02 2,04**
Japan 103 0,03 0,61 0,02 2,01**
EMU 103 0,16 2,65*** 0,06 4,61***
Extra EMU 103 0,15 2,48*** 0,05 3,83***
7RWDO ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
Notes: Moran I=(n/So)∑ i∑ jwij(xi-µ )(xj-µ )/∑ i(xi-µ )
2. Where n=number of observations; So=(∑ i∑ j wij)
is the weights' sum; x= (FDI/Value added); i, j=province; µ =mean of x;  wij =spatial weights. Moran
Test Z=[I-E(I)]/SD(I). Under normality of Z, the theoretical mean is E(I)=(-1/(n-1)); and SD(I) is the
theoretical standard deviation; the reference distribution is the normal.




USA Japan UME Extra UME










of variation Minimum Maximum
FDIVAD 300 43.14 128.96 2.99 0.00 1,111.00
SPECIALIZATION 300 -0.07 0.24 -3.65 -0.83 0.65
DENSITY 300 0.89 0.78 0.88 0.02 5.12
DENSITY_OTHERS 300 0.90 0.63 0.70 0.18 2.96
DIVERSITY 300 1.17 0.21 0.18 0.86 1.82
SMALL 300 1.06 0.30 0.28 0.03 2.84
BIG 300 0.69 1.61 2.33 0.00 18.18
Log(1+FDIVAD) 300 2.10 1.77 0.84 0.00 7.01
Log(1+SPECIALIZATION) 300 -0.11 0.32 -2.87 -1.76 0.50
Log(DENSITY) 300 -0.50 0.95 -1.91 -3.81 1.63
Log(DENSITY_OTHERS) 300 -0.35 0.73 -2.08 -1.72 1.08
Log(DIVERSITY) 300 0.14 0.17 1.20 -0.15 0.60
Log(1+SMALL) 300 0.71 0.14 0.20 0.03 1.35
Log(1+BIG) 300 0.32 0.54 1.68 0.00 2.95Tab. 6
5(*,21￿5(*5(66,21￿5(68/76–￿$//￿6(&7256
Dependent Variable: Log(1+FDI/Value added)
Tobit Model – Maximum Likelihood Estimates





































Log Likelihood -443.2 -444.6 -445.9 -446.3 -446.3 -445.9 -442.4 -442.7 -444.3
Left censored observations 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
Number of observations 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively. All the estimates include regional
and sectoral dummies.Tab. 7
5(*,21￿5(*5(66,21￿5(68/76￿–,1’8675,$/￿6(&7256￿￿￿￿
Dependent Variable: Log(1+FDI/Value added)
Tobit Model – Maximum Likelihood Estimates





































Log Likelihood -299.4 -300.4 -301.4 -301.2 -301.3 -300.8 -296.4 -295.6 -298.3
Left censored observations 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
Number of observations 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
 (1) Manufacturing + energetic products. Standard errors in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively.
All the estimates include regional and sectoral dummies.Tab. 8
3529,1&(￿5(*5(66,21￿5(68/76
All sectors– OLS estimates with regional dummies
Dependent variable: Log(FDI/Value added)



























Regional dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.69 0.62 0.66 0.62 0.64 0.68 0.68
Number of observations 95 95 95 95 95 95 95
White-Standard errors in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively.Tab. 9
3529,1&(￿5(*5(66,21￿5(68/76
All sectors– IV estimates with regional dummies
Dependent variable: Log(FDI/Value added)









































Regional dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.64 0.56 0.66 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.56
Number of observations 95 95 95 95 95 95 95
White-Standard errors in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively. Tab. 10
(;7(16,216￿￿*(2*5$3+,&￿$5($￿$1’￿),50￿6,=(
Region regression results - All sectors
Dependent variable: Log(1+FDI/Value added)
Tobit model – ML estimates





























































































Log Likelihood -444.5 -442.0 -440.4 -437.1 -438.7 -436.6
Left censored observations 48 48 48 48 48 48
Number of observations 300 300 300 300 300 300
Standard errors in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively. All the estimates include
regional and sectoral dummies.  North-West, North-East, Center and South are dummies equal to one if the region belongs to
the corresponding area.Tab. 11
(;7(16,216￿￿*(2*5$3+,&￿$5($￿$1’￿’,9(56,7<
Region regression results - All sectors
Dependent variable: Log(1+FDI/Value added)
Tobit model – ML estimates





































Log Likelihood -443.6 -439.6 -441.2
Left censored observations 48 48 48
Number of observations 300 300 300
Standard errors in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively. All the
estimates include regional and sectoral dummies. North-West, North-East, Center and South are dummies
equal to one if the region belongs to the corresponding area.Tab. 12
(;7(16,216￿￿*(2*5$3+,&￿$5($￿￿63(&,$/,=$7,21￿$1’
’(16,7<
Region regression results - All sectors
Dependent variable: Log(1+FDI/Value added)
Tobit model – ML estimates













NORTH-WEST * Log(1+SPEC) 1.24**
(0.49)






NORTH-WEST * Log(DENSITY) 0.49*
(0.29)






Log Likelihood -442.34 -439.96
Left censored observations 48 48
Number of observations 300 300
Standard errors in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively. All the
estimates include regional and sectoral dummies. North-West, North-East, Center and South are dummies
equal to one if the region belongs to the corresponding area.Tab. 13
52%8671(66￿￿5(*,21￿5(*5(66,21￿5(68/76￿–￿$//￿6(&7256
Dependent Variable: Log(1+FDI/Value added)

























































































Log Likelihood -436.45 -442.21 -442.69 -423.97 -422.88 -418.78 -403.40 -410.20
Left censored
observations
48 48 48 48 48 48 47 46
Number of
observations
300 300 300 285 285 285 280 280
Standard errors in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively. All the estimates include regional and
sectoral dummies.  6PDOOB￿￿ and %LJB￿￿￿ are calculated with the share of firms below 50 employees and above 500 respectively.Tab. 14
52%8671(66￿￿5(*,21￿5(*5(66,21￿5(68/76￿–,1’8675,$/￿6(&7256￿￿￿￿
Dependent Variable: Log(1+FDI/Value added)






























































































Log Likelihood -290.05 -293.66 -295.02 -295.36 -281.87 -282.66 -278.20 -261.95
Left censored
observations
42 42 42 42 42 42 42 40
Number of observations 200 200 200 200 190 190 190 180
(1) Manufacturing + energetic products. Standard errors in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively. All the
estimates include regional and sectoral dummies. 6PDOOB￿￿￿and %LJB￿￿￿￿are calculated with the share of firms below 50 employees and above 500
respectively. )RUHLJQ￿ILUPV¶￿HPSOR\HHV￿are the number of employees in the foreign firms or domestic firms participated by foreign firms.Fig. 1
)’,￿&21&(175$7,21￿$&5266￿3529,1&(6￿(￿5(*,216￿￿/25(1=￿&859(6
(calculated over the share of the value added)
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